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As evidenced by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' the most extensive revision
of the U.S. securities laws since the New Deal era,2 the focus on corporate accountability
and standards of conduct has become magnified.' Related to this development is the con-
tinued emphasis on insider trading regulation.4 Tales of alleged insider trading abuse by
Martha Stewart highlight this scrutiny in the United States.' To an increasing degree, other
developed markets also are becoming more sensitized, as George Soros' predicament in
France illustrates. 6
From a comparative perspective, this article analyzes insider trading regulation in the
United States and other developed markets. On a different level, the article also discusses
the application of Jewish law principles to the propriety of insider trading. The article
concludes by positing that, while the United States' insider trading regimen is less stringent
than that of many other developed markets, the United States' markets remain preeminent
largely due to the relatively effective enforcement of the prevailing statutory and regulatory
mandates. Whether this status will remain intact in light of the challenging dilemmas con-
fronting the U.S. capital markets and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
is uncertain.7
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ENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE (2002); JAMES HAMILTON & TED TRAUTMANN, SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002: LAW AND EXPLANATION (2002).
2. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
3. See John T. Bostelman et al., Enactment of Broad Accounting, Corporate Governance Reform Act Brings New
Prohibitions, Requirements for Executives and Auditors, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1281 (2002).
4. See generally WILLiAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (1996 & Supp. 2002).
5. See Editorial, Martha, Martha, Martha, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2002, at A16; Alessandra Stanley & Con-
stance L. Hays, Martha Stewart's To-Do List May Include Image Polishing, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, § 1, at I.
6. See Jo Wrighton, Soros Awaits Verdict In Case in France On Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2002,
at Cl.
7. See Laura Saunders Egodigwe et al., A Year of Scandals & Sorrow, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at RI0;
Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Is Facing Deeper Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, § 1, at 1 (asserting,
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I. The U.S. Law of Insider Trading
A. FEDERAL LAW AS FUNDAMENTAL SOURCE
The following discussion addresses key principles of U.S. law relating to insider trading.
In this area, federal law is the fundamental source of regulation.' Although a number of
states, such as New York, permit derivative suits against alleged inside traders premised on
unjust enrichment9 and perceived harm to the corporation,' state law frequently is un-
available in this setting." For example, some state courts decline to recognize that an insider
has a disclosure obligation when a subject transaction is executed on an impersonal securities
market. 2 Similarly, in the derivative suit context, these courts find no requisite injury to
the corporation.'3 The effect of these state court decisions is that allegedly aggrieved in-
vestors must resort to federal law.1'
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' 5 focuses on "short-swing" reporting
and trading by officers, directors, and 10 percent equity holders of publicly-held enterprises.
Under Section 16(b), these persons are held strictly liable, requiring disgorgement of all
their gains if they purchase and sell (or sell and purchase) an equity security of a subject
enterprise within a six-month period.'" Section 16 raises several challenging issues, 17 in-
cluding whether the provision has served its historical purposes and should be repealed.'"
inter alia, that the SEC enforcement division is understaffed, that the Commission has lost ground "to keep
up with the growth of business," that its budget is "relatively small," and that the new accounting board is
"beset by budget and staffing difficulties that threaten to undermine its effectiveness").
8. See generally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4.
9. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910,912 (N.Y. 1969).
10. Id. at 913-15.
11. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 187-96 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law); Schein v.
Chasen, 313 So.2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975); WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4, § 16.1, at 1106 ("State law is rarely
applied to stock market insider trading.").
12. See, e.g., Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1994); Bailey v. Vaughan,
359 S.E.2d 599 (W. Va. 1987); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
13. See supra note 12. See Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule-Insider Trading Under
State Law, 45 ALA. L. REV. 753 (1994); Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Insider Trading: Reawakening the Common
Law, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 845 (1982).
14. Note that certain state securities laws may allow government and/or private actions based on alleged
insider trading violations. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4, § 16.4. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG &
RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT §§ 12:01-12:29 (2d ed. 2001).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2000).
16. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). See generally PETER ROMEO & ALAN DYE, SECTION 16 REPORTING GUIDE (2002).
17. For example, these issues include the concepts of beneficial ownership and attribution, identifyingwhich
persons may be officers, and applying the objective versus the pragmatic approach. See, e.g., Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); CBI Indus., Inc. v. Horton, 682 F.2d 643 (7th Cir.
1982); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1978); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 28869, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,709 (Feb. 8,
1991).
18. See Marleen A. O'Conner, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section
16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309 (1989). But see Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management
of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991). See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale,
Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the Securities Echange Act of1934, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 33 (1992).
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In light of the financial debacles that recently have occurred, the reporting provisions of
Section 16(a) 19 enjoy strong congressional support and evidently will be subject to vigorous
enforcement2 °
B. REJECTION OF ACCESS AND PARITY THEORIES
Under the U.S. regimen, no statute codifies the parameters of the insider trading pro-
hibition. Rather, the SEC and the federal courts are the leading actors. Prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court handing down its decisions in the 1980s, lower courts adopted the parity
of information2" and equal access theories22 when construing the "disclose or abstain" man-
date of Section 10(b)23 and SEC Rule 10b-52 4 in the insider trading setting. Under the
parity of information approach, as set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, "anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or... must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed." 5 The equal access approach,
embodying a more narrow concept, holds that "[a]nyone--corporate insider or not-who
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."2 6 With respect to tipper-tippee
liability exposure, lower courts posited that a tippee stood in the shoes of her tipper. 7
Hence, a tippee, who knowingly received material nonpublic information from a tipper
when the tipper could not legally trade on that information, likewise was obligated to adhere
to the disclose or abstain mandate. 8 As will be explored in the article's next section, several
countries follow a number of the foregoing principles through statute.2 9
Today, the parity of information and equal access theories for Section 10(b) objectives
are "dead."3 0 Rather, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the scope of the insider
trading prohibition under Section 10(b) is based on fiduciary duty, trust, and confidence
principles.3 ' Other key elements in this setting include whether the subject information
is deemed "material"3 2 and whether that information is "nonpublic" (namely, whether
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2000).
20. Pursuant to Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 16(a) was amended to require
officers, directors, and 10 percent equity holders to report to the SEC their purchases and sales of subject
securities more promptly, generally by the end of the second day after the transaction.
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc); infra note 25 and
accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); infra
note 26 and accompanying text.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003). See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A ReappraisalofSanta
Fe: Rule Ob- 5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
25. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
26. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231.
27. See, e.g., Elind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. See, e.g., Elkind, 635 F.2d at 156; Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 228.
29. See infra notes 123-140 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Cbiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
31. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (opining that such liability "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence").
32. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232, 240, & n. 18 (1988); Ganino v. Citizens Utilities
Company, 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000); SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997).
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such information has been adequately communicated to and absorbed by the investment
community)."
Thus, as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court, trading in possession of material con-
fidential information by an officer, director, or other insider (such as a controlling share-
holder) in the subject enterprise's securities is illegal under Section 10(b) because, by so
trading, such person breaches a fiduciary duty owed to the enterprise and to the trader(s)
on the opposite side of the transaction(s), namely, the corporation's shareholders 4 Ac-
cordingly, a disclosure obligation exists in this context due to a relationship of confidence
and trust between the transacting parties." Similarly, the subject enterprise's consultants,
including its attorneys, bankers, and accountants, who become privy to material inside
information and have the understanding that such information must remain confidential,
are viewed as quasi-insiders and thereby are held to have a relationship of confidence and
trust with the corporation and its shareholders.16 Such persons thereby are subject to the
disclose or abstain mandate, thus being obligated to adequately disseminate the material
information to the securities markets or abstain from trading (and tipping) until such dis-
semination is successfully completed." However, any insider who seeks to make sufficient
disclosure prior to the subject trade(s) (or tip(s)) violates the company's need for confiden-
tiality concerning such information and incurs liability exposure under state law.38
With respect to "outsiders," to wit, those persons who do not have a fiduciary duty to
those who are on the opposite side of the subject transaction(s), the misappropriation theory
may be available.39 Under this approach, Section 10(b) is violated when the pertinent in-
dividual misappropriates material confidential information for securities trading purposes,
thereby effecting the breach of a relationship of trust and confidence to the source of the
information, regardless whether such source is (or is not) a party to the transaction.40 For
example, an employee who misappropriates material nonpublic information entrusted to
his employer and who uses this information for trading in the subject securities breaches
the trust and confidence owed to his employer and perhaps to the clients of his employer.41
33. See, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 244,
256 (1973). From a general perspective:
[M]aterial information becomes public in either of two ways. The first view is that information that is
disseminated and absorbed by the investment community is public. The second view is premised on
the efficient market theory, and under this view, information is deemed public when the active invest-
ment community is aware of such information. Under the efficient market theory, information that is
known by the investment community will be reflected in the price of an efficiently traded security.
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 3.03 (2002). As used in this article,
the words nonpublic, inside and confidential have an identical meaning.
34. See, e.g., Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
35. Id.
36. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 & n.14.
37. Id. ("The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic
corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct
of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.").
38. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4, § 5.2.
39. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
40. Id. at 654-56. See United States v. Falcone, [2001 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,489
(July 20, 2001).
41. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661-63. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cit. 1981). See generally
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4, § 5.4; Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Misappropriation in the
Supreme Court, 31 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 37 (1998); Donna M. Nagy, Refraining the Misappropriation Tbeory
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The legality of "tipping" is treated in a similar fashion. Ascertaining whether "tipping"
is permissible under Section 10(b), the critical determinants are whether the tipper breached
her fiduciary duty (or a relationship of trust and confidence) by conveying the inside in-
formation to her tippee(s) and whether the tippee(s) knew or should have known of such
breach.42 Without the existence of a breach, a tippee may trade and tip in compliance with
Section 10(b). 43 Under the Supreme Court's rationale, an insider breaches her fiduciary
duty by tipping the material nonpublic information with the motivation of obtaining a
personal benefit. Such personal benefit ordinarily is of a pecuniary nature, such as cash or
enhancement of status impacting one's employment situation that will redound in future
financial benefits.- The conveyance of a gift likewise is a sufficient personal benefit: the
communication of the material confidential information is equated to trading by the insider
herself with the presentation of the gift to the tippee-recipient of the profits gained from
the trades.
45
C. RULE 14E-3-INS IDER TRADING IN THE TENDER OFFER CONTEXT
SEC Rule 14e-3 applies only in the tender offer context.46 In this limited setting, the
prohibitions against trading on and tipping of material inside information are much
broader than those applicable under Section 10(b). Under Rule 14e-3, a person who
procures material nonpublic information concerning a tender offer directly or indirectly
from the offeror (bidder), target company, or an intermediary cannot trade or tip until
there is sufficient public disclosure (and absorption) of this information. 47 Moreover, a
tippee of material nonpublic information concerning a tender offer who knows or should
know that the applicable information comes directly or indirectly from an offeror, target
company, or intermediary likewise can neither trade nor tip prior to sufficient public
dissemination (and absorption) of the information.4s Rule 14e-3 sets forth an exception
to this broad disclose or abstain mandate for multi-service financial firms that adopt and
institute adequate screening mechanisms that effectively prevent the communication of
nonpublic information to those persons who execute or recommend transactions in the
subject corporation's securities. 49
of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-OHagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223 (1998); Steven A. Ramirez &
Christopher M. Gilbert, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Under United States v. O'Hagan: Why Its
Bark is Worse Than Its Bite, 26 SEC. REG. L.J. 162 (1998); ElliottJ. Weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism
Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395 (1998).
42. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
43. Id. at 662.
44. Id. at 662-64.
45. Id. at 664 (opining that "[tlhe tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of
the profits to the recipient"). See Bruce A. Hiler, Dirks v. SEC A Study in Cause and Effect, 43 MD. L. REV.
292 (1984).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003). Rule 14e-3 was adopted in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17120,
[1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980).
47. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a), (d) (2003). The Supreme Court upheld Rule 14e-3's validity in United
States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(d) (2003).
49. Id. § 240.14e-3(b). See SEC Division of Market Regulation, "Broker-Dealer Policies and Procedures
Designed to Segment the Flow and Prevent the Misuse of Material Nonpublic Information," [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,520 (1990); Theodore A. Levine et al., Multiservice Securities
Firms: Coping With Conflicts in a Tender Offer Context, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41 (1988); Marc I. Steinberg
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D. CRITIQUE OF THE U.S. INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION
U.S. law on insider trading is subject to criticism. Today, due to Supreme Court decisions,
principles focusing on fiduciary duty, financial benefit, and misappropriation define the
legality of transactions effected or contemplated. The goal that ordinary investors play on
a level playing field with market professionals, having equal access to material nonpublic
information, no longer survives under Section 10(b) insider trading jurisprudence) ° Irre-
spective that Congress designed the federal securities acts to provide greater investor safe-
guards than state law, the Supreme Court's heavy reliance on state law-based principles of
fiduciary duty minimizes that congressional objective."'
Perhaps not surprisingly, the SEC, acting purportedly within its rulemaking authority,
has expanded restrictive Supreme Court law. For example the SEC's adoption of Rule 14e-
3 sets forth broad parity of information and anti-tipping proscriptions in the tender offer
setting." In the Section 10(b) context, the SEC has advanced a "flexible" construction of
Supreme Court precedent,13 even promulgating new rules that in practice "overturn" lower
court authority 4 In another regulatory development, the SEC's embracement of Regula-
tion FD seeks to terminate the practice of selective disclosure of material nonpublic infor-
& John Fletcher, Compliance Programs for Insider Trading, 47 SMU L. Rv. 1783 (1994). See also Charles
Gasparino, Brokerage Firms Agree to Fix Stock Research, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2002, at Cl; Randall Smith,
Regulators Set Accord With Securities Firms But Some Issues Persist, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Cl.
50. See supra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
51. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun opined:
By its narrow construction of § 10(b) and Rule lob-5, the Court places the federal securities laws in
the rearguard of this movement, a position opposite to the expectations of Congress at the time the
securities laws were enacted .... I cannot agree that the statute and Rule are so limited. The Court
has observed that the securities laws were not intended to replicate the law of fiduciary relations. Rather,
their purpose is to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities markets
where common-law protections have proved inadequate. As Congress itself has recognized, it is integral
to this purpose to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages
among investors.
Id. at 248. See also Alison G. Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1982);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties Into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1189 (1995).
52. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
53. Two such examples are the SEC's assertion that applicable Supreme Court decisions allow for broad
interpretations of trading "on the basis of' inside information and the requisite "benefit" for tipping purposes.
See, e.g., SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11 th Cir. 1998) (rejecting SEC's assertion but adopting a presumption
of use when one trades while knowingly possessing material nonpublic information); SEC v. Stevens, SEC
Litigation Release No. 12813 (Mar. 19, 1991) (settlement where SEC alleged that insider received personal
benefit under Dirks test by "tipping" inside information to securities analysts).
54. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1, 10b5-2, adopted in, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43154, [2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,319 (Aug. 15, 2000). By adopting in Rule lob5-1 a broad
"awareness" test rather than a "use" standard for determining when trading is "on the basis" of material
nonpublic information, the SEC rejected the standards set forth in at least two appellate court decisions. See
United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998); SEC v. Adler, 37 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998); see also
Robert A. Horowitz & Karen Y. Bitar, Insider Trading: New SEC Rules and an Important New Case, 28 SEC. REC.
L.J. 364 (2000); Donna M. Nagy, The "Possession vs. Use" Debate in the Context of Securities Trading By Traditional
Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129 (1999); Stuart Sinai, Rumors, Possession v.
Use, Fiduciary Duty and Other Current Insider Trading Considerations, 55 Bus. LAw. 743 (2000). Moreover, by its
promulgation of Rule lOb5-2, the SEC has "overturned" the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cit. 1991) (en banc) (discussed infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text).
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mation by company insiders to market professionals, institutional shareholders, and other
favored constituents. 55 While such selective disclosure is illegal insider tipping under the
laws of several countries16 and indeed was proscribed in this country before the Supreme
Court's decision in Dirks,"7 this conduct currently is prohibited under Section 10(b) juris-
prudence only if the tipper seeks to gain personally from the selective disclosure. 5s
Some specific examples demonstrate the inconsistent treatment of U.S. insider trading
law. One striking illustration involves the different treatment accorded to tender offers
because of SEC Rule 14e-3.19 Literally, a person can legally procure profits by trading on
material inside information or be found liable solely due to the fortuity of whether the
transaction involves a tender offer. For instance, Barry Switzer, who served as the football
coach for the Dallas Cowboys and the University of Oklahoma, inadvertently was the re-
cipient of material confidential information that derived from a reputable corporate exec-
utive concerning a forthcoming merger.60 Aware that the information was reliable because
of his relationship with the executive, Switzer (along with his friends) traded on the basis
of such information, making a handsome profit.6i Because the executive did not know that
Switzer was privy to the subject communications, no unlawful tipping occurred.62 In that a
tippee's liability pursuant to Section 10(b) is derivative,63 the holding that the insider-tipper
had not breached his fiduciary duty meant that Switzer, as the tippee, had lawfully traded
and, accordingly, was entitled to retain his profits.64
The result in Switzer would have been otherwise if the contemplated transaction was
structured as a tender offer (and not a merger). In such event, Rule 14e-3 would have been
invoked (as well as Section 10(b)). Although Switzer would have escaped liability under
55. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
86,319 (Aug. 15, 2000). Generally, Regulation FD
prohibits issuers or individuals acting on their behalf from selectively disclosing material nonpublic
information to certain enumerated persons (generally securities market professionals and holders of
the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information) without disclosing the
information publicly. If the selective disclosure is intentional, then the issuer must publicly disclose the
information simultaneously by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K to the SEC or in a manner reasonably
designed to provide broad distribution of the information. If the selective disclosure is unintentional,
then the issuer must disclose the information to the public promptly, but in no event after the later of
24 hours or the opening of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Violating Regu-
lation FD exposes the issuer to SEC administrative and civil enforcement action, but does not by itself
impose any Rule lOb-5 antifraud liability on the issuer or establish a private tight of action.
MARc I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAw 428 (3d ed. 2001). In November 2002, the SEC instituted
its first enforcement actions based on alleged violations of Regulation FD. Three administrative proceedings
were settled and one section 21(a) Report was issued. These proceedings are discussed in 34 Sec. Reg. & Rep
(BNA) 1934 (2002). See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Jason B. Myers, Lurking in the Shadows: The Hidden Issues
of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation FD, 27 IowA J. CORP. L. 173 (2002).
56. See infra notes 134-140 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
58. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
59. For a description of Rule 14e-3, see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
60. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 758, 762 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
61. Id. at 762-64.
62. Id. at 758, 766.
63. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660-64 (1983). See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
64. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 764-66.
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Section 10(b), he would have breached Rule 14e-3 by trading on material confidential
information that he knew came from a reliable inside source. 65 Thus, pursuant to Rule
14e-3, regardless of the tipper's liability, a tippee has liability by knowingly trading on
material confidential information that directly or indirectly comes from a subject corpo-
ration. 66 Hence, Switzer's avoidance of liability and permissible retention of large profits
were due to the manner in which the subject transaction was structured.
This inconsistency becomes more pronounced when the Chestman67 case, involving a
criminal prosecution, is examined. There, the Second Circuit, en banc, ruled that Chest-
man avoided liability under Section 10(b) because his tipper did not breach a fiduciary
duty by communicating material nonpublic information concerning a forthcoming tender
offer. 6s Nonetheless, Chestman's criminal conviction that he violated Rule 14e-3 was
affirmed because he knowingly traded while having material inside information regarding
a tender offer that derived, directly or indirectly, from the bidder or target corporation.69
Hence, although Chestman (like Switzer) escaped Section 1 0(b) liability because the sub-
ject tipper did not unlawfully tip,7 0 Chestman (unlike Switzer) was found liable under
Rule 14e-3 because, unfortunately for Chestman, the "deal" was structured as a tender
offer rather than another viable acquisition alternative, such as a merger, exchange of
shares, or sale of assets. 71 Such disparate treatment cannot be reconciled with investor
protection, market integrity, or fundamental concepts of fair treatment among similarly-
situated market participants.72
The Chestman decision has another troubling issue. In determining whether a fiduciary
duty was present and gave rise to the disclose or abstain mandate, 73 the court ruled that
marriage, considered alone, does not constitute a fiduciary relationship. 4 For such a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence to exist, other attributes must be present, such as an un-
derstanding to maintain the confidentiality of the material information or a pre-existing
status of being a recipient of family business secrets.75 Not only does the court's rationale
minimize "family values," it also, in effect, gives greater sanctity to a stockholder's rela-
tionship with a director of a publicly-held corporation (with whom such stockholder has
65. See Rule 14e-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2002).
66. Id. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 686-91; supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text, infra note
69 and accompanying text.
67. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
68. Id. at 570-571.
69. Id. at 556-64. Note, moreover, that "Rule 14e-3 does not require that a person charged with violating
the rule have knowledge that the nonpublic information in his possession relates to a tender offer." SEC v.
Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 79 (lst Cir. 2000). Accord, United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641,650 (8th Cir. 1998);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17120 (1980).
70. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 558.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775-76 (1979) (stating that purposes of Securities Act
include "investor protection," achieving "a high standard of business ethics... in every facet of the securities
industry," and observing that "the welfare of investors and financial intermediaries are inextricably linked-
frauds perpetrated upon either business or investors can redound to the detriment of the other and to the
economy as a whole").
73. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
74. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (stating that "Keith's status as Susan's husband could not itself establish
fiduciary status").
75. Id. at 568-71. But see SEC v. Lenfest, 949 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1996); United States v. Reed, 601 F.
Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'don other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
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never spoken or met) than to his/her spouse, child, parent, or sibling. This result is due to
the U.S. Supreme Court's focus on the presence of a fiduciary duty (or a relationship of
trust and confidence) premised on state law principles. Without a concept based on equal
access, state law principles of fiduciary duty can cause, as they did in Chestman, an illogical
result.1
6
By promulgating Rule 10b5-2, 77 the SEC in practical effect has nullified this part of
Chestman. The rule invokes the Section 10(b) misappropriation theory when a person is the
recipient of material confidential information from a spouse, child, parent, or sibling, unless
such person can show that, in light of the particular family relationship, no reasonable
expectation of confidentiality existed.7" It remains to be determined whether the SEC's rule
adoption will be upheld.79 After all, the Commission, in all practicality, has "overturned" a
decision handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals. 0
The foregoing evidences that U.S. law, with respect to insider trading, is deficient.
Statutes generally are silent on insider trading,si thus leaving this area largely to the courts.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in declining to embrace the parity of information and equal
access rationales, has adhered to traditional state law concepts of fiduciary duty."2 This
approach, in turn, as illustrated by the Cbestman and Switzer decisions,8 3 has led to absurd
lower court precedent. On another level, the SEC, seeking to combat narrow Supreme
Court decisions regarding the Section 10(b) law of insider trading, has enunciated expansive
interpretations of those decisions4
The SEC, frustrated with its confined authority under Section 10(b), has reacted by
prescribing Rules 14e-3 and Regulation FD.85 The effect is all too frequently the existence
76. In a separate opinion, Judge Winter reasoned:
[F]amily members who have benefitted from the family's control of the corporation are under a duty
not to disclose confidential corporate information that comes to them in the ordinary course of family
affairs. In the case of family-controlled corporations, family and business affairs are necessarily inter-
twined, and it is inevitable that from time to time normal familial interactions will lead to the revelation
of confidential corporate matters to various family members. Indeed, the very nature of familial rela-
tionships may cause the disclosure of corporate matters to avoid misunderstandings among family
members or suggestions that a family member is unworthy of trust.
Cbestman, 947 F.2d at 579 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2003).
78. Id. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 43154, [2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 86,319 (Aug. 15, 2000).
79. Cf. The Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating SEC Rule 19c-4).
80. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 42259, [1999-2000
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,228, at 82,863-64 (Dec. 20, 1999) (release proposing Rule
10b5-2 and expressing dissatisfaction with Cbestman as being too restrictive).
81. Statutory treatment exists with respect to certain issues relating to insider trading, such as "short-swing"
trading, option traders, insider trades during specified "blackout" periods, the ability of contemporaneous
traders to bring a private right of action, the levying of money penalties, and the adoption of specific mechanisms
to be implemented by broker-dealers and investment advisers. See, e.g., WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4,
§§ 6.2, 6.3, 6.8, 7.3.3 (discussing Sections 16, 20(d), 20A, 21A of the Securities Exchange Act); supra notes 15-
20 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 31, 34-36, 51 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101; [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,683 (SEC 2000); dis-
cussion note 55 supra.
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of inconsistent insider trading regulations that poorly serve the investing public. Thus, the
U.S. framework on insider trading should not be emulated. Other countries apparendy
agree .
6
H. Regulation of Insider Trading in Other Developed Markets
Contrasted with the United States, where insider trading law generally has been for-
mulated by the judiciary,87 countries abroad have adopted detailed and specific legislation
defining the parameters of the insider trading proscription.8" Irrespective of this codification
approach, ambiguities persist that await legislation or judicial resolution. 89
A. USE OF STATUTORILY DEFINED TERMS
Unlike the United States, key terms comprising the insider trading offense are delineated
by statute.- For example, in the United Kingdom (U.K.), inside information is defined as
information that "(1) relates to particular securities or their issuers; (2) is specific or precise;
(3) has not been made public; and (4) if it were made public would be likely to have a
significant effect on the price or value of any security."9 1 Under German law, an "insider
86. See infra notes 88-140 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 2 1-49 and accompanying text.
88. See MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
105-48 (1999); infra notes 90-140 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
91. Criminal justice Act 1993 (CJA), 36, part V, §§ 56, 60(4) (Eng.), as set forth in Alistair Alcock, United
Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION vol. 6, bklt. 1, 27 (Robert C. Rosen ed., 1994).
In 1989, the Council of the European Communities promulgated the European Economic Community
Directive Coordinating Regulation on Insider Trading. Council Directive 89/592/EEC1989 OJ. (L 344) 30
[hereinafter Directive]. The Directive, for example, sets forth minimum standards for defining the concepts
"inside information" and "insider" with respect to which Member States of the European Union must comply.
Id. art. 5. Nonetheless, significant details regarding methods of enforcement are left principally to the Member
States. Id. art. 8. See Isabelle Pingel, The EC Directive of1989, in INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 5, 5-6 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed. 1992).
Article I of the Directive provides that inside information is "information which has not been made public
of a precise nature ... which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price
of the . . .security." Directive, supra, art. 1. Article 2 sets forth that an insider is "any person who ... by
virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer, by virtue of
his holding in the capital of the issuer, or because he has access ... by virtue of the exercise of his employment,
profession or duties, possesses inside information [and takes] advantage of that information with full knowledge
of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account of a third party, either directly
or indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer... to which that information relates." Directive, supra, art. 2.
Article 4 provides that a "secondary insider" is "any person [other than a primary insider] who with full
knowledge of the facts possesses inside information, the direct or indirect source of which could not be other
than a [primary insider]." Directive, supra, art. 4.
The Directive, providing minimum standards only, leaves to the judgment of the Member States whether
to adhere to more stringent requirements than those promulgated in the Directive. Directive, supra, art. 6. The
Directive mandates that each Member State designate competent authorities "to ensure that the provisions
adopted pursuant to [the] Directive are applied [and that those authorities] be given all supervisory and inves-
tigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions." Directive, supra, art. 6. The Directive
declines to require whether administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be implemented by each Member
State for enforcement purposes. Rather, Article thirteen provides that "[e]ach Member State shall determine
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fact" is "knowledge of a fact not publicly known relating to one or more issuers of insider
securities or to insider securities and which fact is capable of substantially influencing the
price of the insider securities in the event of it becoming publicly known." 92 Other nations
likewise define, pursuant to statute, the elements of privileged information or an inside
fact.93 Additional key concepts also are set forth by statute, including, for example, those
persons who are defined as insiders, enjoying a "special relationship" with the enterprise
or having "access" to nonpublic information."
Not surprisingly, interpretive issues must be addressed under these statutes. Under the
U.K. framework, for instance, when is information "specific or precise" (as contrasted to
being general or not specific)? Is information of the subject company engaging in prelim-
inary merger discussions with a prospective bidder precise or not sufficiently specific under
the statute?95 Pursuant to German law, when is a fact not publicly known so as to be deemed
an "insider fact?"
96
In contrast to the U.S. approach, the definition of materiality focuses on the infor-
mation's impact on market price.9 7 Hence, the U.S. standard, analyzing whether the
affected information would assume significance to the mythical "reasonable" person in
making her investment decision90 has not been accepted with frequency elsewhere. 99
For example, the laws of the following jurisdictions center their inquiry on the infor-
mation's impact on the market price of the affected security: (Ontario) Canada,100
the penalties to be applied for infringement of the measures taken pursuant to [the] Directive." See Pingel,
supra, at 6-21; STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 122-23. See also New Curbs on Insider Trading, Market Abuse Agreed
to by EU Parliament, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 432 (2002).
92. Securities Act § 13. See Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER
DEAlING 129, 134 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
93. See, e.g., France-Law No. 90-08, J.O., July 20, 1990; Italy--Consolidated Act on Financial Inter-
mediation art. 180, para. 3, implemented by CONSOB Regulation No. 11520. See also STEINBERG, supra note
88, at 130-32, 138-39.
94. See, e.g., Directive, supra note 9 ; Australia--Corporations Law § 1002G(l); Canada-Ontario Securities
Act § 76(1), 76(5).
95. The ambiguity of the United Kingdom's definition of inside information has been criticized. See Hick-
inbotham & Vaupel, supra note 92, at 100. Note that the French judiciary has held that "privileged information"
encompasses negotiations relating to a prospective takeover offer by a French company seeking to acquire the
securities of a publicly held U.S. corporation. See CA Paris, 6 July 1994, Les Petites Affices (PetitesAffiches) No.
137, 16 Nov. 1994, p. 17, note Ducouloux-Favard, discussed in Patricia Peterson, France, in INTERNATIONAL
INsIDER DEALING 152, 156 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
96. See Hartmut Krause, The German Securities Trading Act (1994): A Ban on Insider Trading and an Issuer's
Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Nanpublic Information, 30 INT'L LAw. 555, 562 (1996) ("Neither the German
Act nor the EC Insider Trading Directive offer guidance as to when information should be considered known
to the public.") Cf. Australian Corporations Law § 1002B(2) (setting forth that information is generallyavailable
if "(a) it consists of readily observable matter; or (b) without limiting the generality of paragraph (a), both the
following subparagraphs apply: (i) it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring
it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in securities of bodies corporate of a kind whose price or
value might be affected by the information; and (ii) since it was so made known, a reasonable period for it to
be disseminated among such persons has elapsed").
97. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
99. See Directive, supra note 91, art. I; infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
100. Ontario Securities Act § l(l) (defining a material fact as a "fact that significantly affects or would
reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of securities [of the subject
issuer]").
Note that there is no federal securities law in Canada. Rather, regulation is provided by each of that country's
ten provinces and two territories. The Ontario securities legislation is viewed as the most significant and will
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Mexico,1 1 United Kingdom, 102 France,os Germany, 4 Italy, °s and Australia. "" Indeed, rela-
tively few nations, such as Japan, 17 adopt the U.S. approach.
Thus, although in need of judicial clarification relating to unresolved issues, the insider
trading statutes in non-U.S. developed markets set forth the essential terms and definitions
that comprise the prohibition. As will be discussed below, the fiduciary relationship (or trust
and confidence) analysis adhered to by the U.S. Supreme Court is rejected elsewhere. 1°8
B. GENERAL ADHERENCE TO THE "ACCESS" STANDARD
Other countries have rejected the U.S. fiduciary duty (or relationship of trust and con-
fidence) standard to define the contours of illegal insider trading and tipping.' 9 The U.S.
approach is problematic. For example, the U.S. rationale focuses on the existence (or ab-
sence) of relatively difficult inquiries to determine whether the insider trading prohibition
prevails in a specific setting: Does a fiduciary relationship exist? 110 What type of relationship
is viewed as fiduciary or one of trust and confidence?"' Which individuals are deemed
quasi-insiders and under what circumstances?" 2 What facts establish misappropriation of
the subject information?" 3 Must an "insider" indeed "use" or merely be "in possession of"
the pertinent information at the time of the trade(s)? "1 What must be shown to prove that
a tipper conveyed the subject information for "personal benefit"? What is deemed an "im-
proper personal benefit"? " ' To leave these questions to ad hoc adjudication and SEC rule-
making" 6 may be acceptable to the United States with its abundance of litigation and its
plethora of lawyers, regulators, and judges. This approach, arguably representing the an-
tithesis of cost-effectiveness, understandably garners little support elsewhere." 7
be used as the exemplar in this article. See generally Philip Anisman, The Proposals for a Securities Market Law
for Canada: Purpose and Process, 19 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 330 (1981).
101. Securities Market Law art. 16 bis (Mex.).
102. Criminal Justice Act 1993, c. 36 (Eng.).
103. Law No. 90-08, J.O., July 20, 1990 (defining privileged information as "any precise non-public infor-
mation ... which, if made public, might affect the price of the security").
104. Securities Act § 13, supra note 92.
105. Consolidated Act on Financial Intermediation, art. 180, para. 3. Cf former Law No. 157 art. 3. See
Paolo Casella, Italy, in INSIDER TRADING: THE LAws OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND JA.AN 109, 112-113
(Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 1992). See generally Eugenio Ruggiero, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Italy, 22
BROOK. J. INr't L. 157 (1996).
106. Corporations Law § 1002G(1) (setting forth that the information, if it were generally available, "might
have a material effect on the price or value of [the subject] securities").
107. Securities and Exchange Law art. 166, para. 2 (defining material facts as encompassing those facts
"which may have significant influence on the invesunent decision of investors"). See STEINBERG, supra note 88,
at 146 (and sources cited therein).
108. See infra notes 109-140 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 123-140 and accompanying text.
110. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
111. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); supra notes 67-73 and accom-
panying text.
112. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
113. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Chestman, 947 F.2d at 551.
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2003); supra notes 53-54, 84 and accompanying text.
115. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984); supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb5-1, 240. lOb5-2 (2003); supra notes 53-54, 77-80 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 123-140 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, from a fairness perspective, the U.S. framework contains significant loopholes.
For example, should the loose-lip executive and his tippees escape insider trading liability
when those tippees intentionally trade on material inside information? " ' Should a person
be criminally convicted or be entirely exonerated based on the distinction between a tender
offer and a merger?, 9 Should a relative or friend be able to trade legally on material inside
information when she inadvertently learns of this information when visiting the insider's
home or office?O By adopting a fiduciary relationship-like model (that is rejected by the
SEC in the tender offer context'), the U.S. insider trading regime complicates an already
confusing area and at times unfairly treats similarly situated market participants. 2 2 Con-
trasted with the United States, many countries opt for an insider trading prohibition based
on the "access" doctrine.'23 Generally, this standard proscribes insider trading by those
persons who have unequal access to the material confidential information. This standard
may extend the insider trading proscription to tippees who receive the material information
from traditional insiders or others who, because of their employment, office, or profession,
have access to this information.2 4 This general approach is followed in several jurisdictions,
including the United Kingdom,2 5 France, 2 6 Germany,'2 7 Italy,'2 (Ontario) Canada,29 and
Mexico. 3 0
Significantly fewer jurisdictions elect a more expansive approach based on the parity of
information principle.' For instance, Australia's prohibition against insider trading gen-
erally encompasses any person or entity who possesses nonpublic, price-sensitive infor-
mation.'3 2 Under the Australian regimen, one is deemed an insider, hence becoming subject
118. Such conduct today is governed by Regulation FD. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
119. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc); supra notes 59-86 and accom-
panying text.
120. Cf. Trib. Corr. Paris, 15 Oct. 1976, JCP 1977, 1 18543-D. 1978.381 (architect deemed insider due to
his becoming privy to confidential information while visiting his client's office), discussed in Dominique Borde,
France, in INsIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE: CURRENT STATUS 59, 65 (Gerard Wegen & Heinz-Dieter
Assmann eds., 1994).
121. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2003); supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 50-86 and accompanying text.
123. EC Directive on Insider Trading, supra note 91; infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
125. See Criminal Justice Act §§ 52, 57 (1994); infra note 135 and accompanying text.
126. Hence, under Regulation 90-08, the following are defined as insiders:
(a) [Plersons holding privileged information by reason of their capacity as members of management,
board of directors of an issuer, or by reason of their functions which they exercise with respect to
an issuer; (b) [plersons holding privileged information by reason of the planning and execution of
a financial operation: (c) [plersons to whom privileged information is disclosed during the exercise
of their professional activities or functions; and (d) [p]ersons who, with full knowledge of the facts,
possess privileged information originating directly or indirectly from [any of the foregoing insiders].
Id. See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 138.
127. Securities Act § 13(1). See generally Krause, supra note 96; Christof von Dryander, The German Securities
Trading Act: Insider Trading and Other Secondary Market Regulation, 9 No. I INSIGHTS 26 (1995).
128. Consolidated Act on Financial Intermediation, art. 180, para. 3. See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 132.
129. Ontario Securities Act, ch. S-5, § 76(5) (1990) (Can.).
130. See Amendments to the Mexican Securities Law, 465 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 83 (2001).
131. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc); supra note 25 and
accompanying text.
132. See Corporations Law § 1002G (Austl.).
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to the insider trading and tipping prohibitions, by "(a) possess[ing] information that is not
generally available but, if the information were generally available, a reasonable person
would expect it to have a material effect on the price or value of securities of a body
corporate; and (b) ... know[ing], or ought reasonably know[ing] that (i) the information is
not generally available; and (ii) if it were generally available, it might have a material effect
on the price or value of those securities." "'
C. TPPING LIABILITY
In regard to "tipping," as with liability of insiders and access persons for trading, the
U.S. standard has been rejected elsewhere. Adhering to an expansive approach, Australia,
for example, prohibits any tippee (regardless how remote) who knowingly has material
inside information from trading on or tipping that information.1 4 Similarly, the United
Kingdom has a broad proscription against trading and tipping for those persons who know-
ingly have obtained material confidential information, directly or indirectly, from an
insider.3
A number of other nations adhere to approaches that are more straightforward than the
U.S. standard but that may not be as encompassing. Under German law, for example,
primary insiders are prohibited from trading and tipping.136 However, recipients of material
confidential information conveyed by a primary insider, while subject to the prohibition
against trading, permissibly may tip the subject information to others." 7 France,"'3 Italy,"t9
and Japan' 40 have adopted similar standards.
133. Id. See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 142.
134. Corporations Law § 1002E (Ausd.). See ROMAN TOMASic & STEPHEN BoTTOMLEY, CORPORATIONS LAW
IN AUSTRALIA 698-99 (1995). See generally PAUL REDMOND, COMPANIES AND SECURITIES LAW (2d ed. 1992).
135. Criminal Justice Act §§ 52, 57 (1994). See Tim Herrington & Jason Glover, The United Kingdom, in
INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE: CURRENT STATUS 33, 43 (Gerard Wegen & Heinz-Dieter Assmann
eds., 1994); Hickinbotham & Vaupel, supra note 92, at 109.
136. See Krause, supra note 96, at 562.
137. Securities Act § 14(1)-(2). See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 128-29:
Primary insiders are prohibited from trading on inside information for their own account or for the
account of others, conveying inside information to others without proper authorization, and making
recommendations to a third party to trade based upon inside information (tipping). Secondary insiders
are prohibited from trading for their own account or for the account of others. Unlike primary insiders,
secondary insiders are neither prohibited from disclosing information to other people nor from tipping.
However, the recipients of such information would then become secondary insiders (tippees) and thus
would be prohibited from trading on the inside information for their own account or for the account
of others. Nonetheless, tippees can continue to pass along inside information provided that they do
not trade on it themselves or for the account of others. This result may be explained as a means of
facilitating the free flow of information in order to more expeditiously transform non-public inside
information into public information.
Id. See supra notes 96, 127.
138. Law No. 90-08, arts. 2-5, J.O., July 20, 1990; art. 10-1 of Ordinance No. 67-833. See Borde, supra
note 120, at 66-69.
139. Consolidated Act on Financial Intermediation No. 58, art. 180, paras. 1, 2, discussed in STEINBERG,
supra note 88, at 132-33.
140. Securities and Exchange Law art. 166, paras. 1, 3. See Toshio Kobayashi, Hidetaka Mihara & Fumihide
Sugimoto, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 321, 334-35 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
VOL. 37, NO. 1
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION-A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 167
III. Insider Trading Under Jewish Law
This article briefly will addressJewish law 141 in this comparative analysis of insider trading
regulation. A number of examples seek to illustrate the application of Jewish law in this
setting. For example, assume that three days before the subject corporation's public an-
nouncement of significantly increased earnings, the enterprise's chief executive officer is
approached by the former wife of another insider regarding the purchase of her stock.
Without communicating any information about the company's affairs, the chief executive
officer purchases the stock (which increases in value after public disclosure is made of the
company's earnings). In this situation, the parties are in contractual privity with one an-
other, having engaged in a face-to-face transaction. Jewish law prohibits this conduct.
The vendor, according to Jewish law, must divulge to his prospective purchaser any defects
in the product to be sold. 142 Although the insider is the purchaser and not the vendor when
the corporate nonpublic information is positive, the same principle should apply. After all, in
another scenario, if the inside information involved "bad" news, then the insider would be
selling the securities and thus be the seller-vendor. Thus, in all practicality, whether the in-
sider is the purchaser or seller of the subject securities should not be deemed relevant. 143
The result under Jewish law should be the same even if the insider, rather than engaging
in a face-to-face transaction, trades in an impersonal securities market, such as the New
York Stock Exchange. An insider, particularly an executive officer, is an agent of the cor-
porate enterprise. Under Jewish law, an agent is charged with acting in the principal's best
interests. 1' Trading on inside information or tipping such information is contrary to the
company's best interests. For example, due to investor lack of confidence in the integrity
of the subject company's management, shareholders may dump their shares, causing a sharp
decline in the stock price. A decreased stock price may render it more difficult for the
company to raise needed capital and retain key personnel. 14 Hence, a director or executive
officer violates Jewish law by trading on or tipping inside information.
141. Generally, Jewish law (halakhah) has three components: "Laws between man and his fellow; Matters
of Torah; [and] Performance of precepts . ... " Menachum Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (1985). With respect to the structure of Jewish law literature, one source has stated:
Jewish law is composed of several layers of literature. The most basic layers are the Mishna (compilation
around 200 C.E.) and Gemara (compilation around 500 C.E.), which together compose the Talmud.
The Talmud represents a vast system of laws and customs, written in a noncodified form. Referring to
the Talmud, a great number ofJewish law scholars have written comprehensive and authoritativevolumes
of commentaries and responsa from the sixth century up to the contemporary time. Some writers inte-
grated the massive literature into formal codes. The most distinct codes are those written byMaimonides
(twelfth century; Spain, Egypt) and R. Joseph Karo (sixteenth century; Turkey, Eretz Israel).
Yehoshua Liebermann, Economic Efficiency and Making of the Law: The Case of Transaction Costs in Jewish Law,
15 J. LEGAL STUD. 387, 389 (1986).
142. See AARoN LEVINE, FREE ENTERPRISE AND JEWISH LAW -ASPECTS OF JEWISH BusiNEss ETHICS 117 (1980).
143. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (1980). Cf. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49
(2d Cir. 1951) (Hand, Learned J.) (stating "the director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by
the very sale: for it would be a sorry distinction to allow [the insider] to use the advantage of his position to
induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had
become one"). Moreover, the chief executive officer is an agent of the business enterprise, hence precluding
unfair insider dealing in this context. See infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
144. See ISRAEL H. LEVINTHAL, THE JEWISH LAW OF AGENCY 66 (1922).
145. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969).
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Similarly, a lawyer violates Jewish law if she is retained by the company, knowingly re-
ceives information that she knows is to be kept confidential, and elects to trade on or tip
such information.'- UnderJewish law, an attorney retained bya company should be deemed
an agent as well as a fiduciary of that company. 47 Consequently, like the corporate director
or executive officer, the attorney is obligated to act in the corporation's best interests and
to carry out the directives of the insiders (so long as such directives are lawful and not
unethical). Trading and/or tipping by the attorney are antithetical to the company's best
interests and therefore should be proscribed under Jewish law.
The "typical" bartender example is a more difficult situation under Jewish law. By way
of analogy, under U.S. law, if the bartender overheard a "confidential" discussion among
corporate insiders, without such insiders benefiting from the selective disclosure (or in-
tending to convey a gift to the bartender), and the information did not relate to a tender
offer, the bartender could legally trade or tip.148 Clearly, under Jewish law, the bartender is
not an agent or fiduciary of the company. However, principles exist under Jewish law that
may preclude the bartender from trading on the material inside information. Exodus 23:7
not only prohibits lying but also mandates that an individual "distance himself from false-
hood."14s Deuteronomy 19:14 states: "Do not move the border markers," signifying, among
other things, that unfair competition should be proscribed, and more expansively, that
market participants should perform on a level playing field.5 0 Deuteronomy 16:20 directs
that "Justice, justice, you shall pursue," suggesting that "the Torah is mandating a particular
aggressiveness in performing this commandment."'' These commandments arguably may
prohibit any person in possession of material nonpublic information, including a complete
stranger to the corporation (and its insiders), from trading on material inside information,
irrespective whether that information was learned directly or indirectly from an inside
source. An individual who is privy to material nonpublic information that is not available
to the party on the other side of the transaction clearly is playing with a "stacked deck" and
is the certain "winner" in this high stakes, financial contest. The "playing field" is anything
but level, denying the uninformed trader any realistic possibility of success.' The conclu-
sion thus may be reached that allowing those persons who are selectively privy to material
inside information (regardless of how and from what source such information was obtained)
to financially benefit at the expense of uninformed traders is an injustice that is contrary to
Jewish law."s3
146. See LEVINTHAL, supra note 144, at 66-77.
147. See id.
148. See Switzer v. SEC, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1994).
149. As set forth in Steven H. Resnicoff, Lying and Lawyering: Contrasting American andJewisb Law, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 937, 959 n.90 (2002).
150. As set forth in Rabbi Avi Geller, Lively Parsha Shoftims 5762, available at http://www.aish.com/
torahportionAivelyparsha/Lively-Parsha-Shoftim_5762.asp(last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
151. As stated in JOSEPH TELUSHK1N, BIBLICAL LITERAcY 492 (1997).
152. See AARON LEVINE, CASE STUDIES IN JEWISH BUSINESS ETHics 172 (2000) (stating that selective disclo-
sure or tipping of inside information "entails violations of various biblical prohibitions").
153. Note that insider trading is prohibited in certain circumstances under Israeli law. See International
Securities Regulation Binder 3, at 40-42 (R. Rosen ed. 2002) (describing insider trading law of Israel and com-
menting that "the enforcement of the new rules, to date, has not been very effective"). In Israel, the United
States, and other "countries where legislation exists forbidding the use of insider trading, its use becomes
halakhically illegal." MEIR TAMARI, THE CHALLENGE OF WEALTH 101 (1995).
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IV. Comments Favoring U.S. Regulation
The preceding discussion illustrates that the U.S. approach regarding insider trading
regulation lags behind other established jurisdictions in terms of facilitating investor pro-
tection and market integrity. Nevertheless, in practical reality, the U.S. regime remains
preeminent regardless of its shortcomings. The succinct explanation is the existence of a
relatively rigorous enforcement and remedial framework that has widespread acquiescence,
if not support, among market participants and the general populace.5 4 Whether this per-
ception retains its vitality in the aftermath of the corporate debacles that have occurred in
the United States awaits resolution. "
As seen by the experiences of several countries, statutes that apply strict standards (such
as in regard to insider trading) are meaningful only to the degree that they are implemented
with some regularity. The lack or insufficiency of effective government resources, person-
nel, and surveillance poses little deterrent to prospective perpetrators. Consequently, com-
petent personnel must be procured by the applicable regulator, armed with appropriate
resources to undertake meaningful surveillance and prosecution.5 6 This commitment does
not appear to be forthcoming with impressive vigor by many countries that have stricter
legal standards than the United States. "
Along with more relaxed enforcement of statutorily rigorous standards in the subject
country, often cultural attitudes are found that acquiesce in the propriety of insider trad-
ing. '8 Such practices traditionally have been viewed by affected participants as ingrained
in the securities market and as the way that business relations have been carried on for
decades (if not centuries).5 9 This attitude may impede regulators from commencing actions
against purportedly reputable business executives. Principal reliance on a criminal method
of enforcement (in that many countries do not meaningfully allow for civil enforcement by
either the government or allegedly injured private parties' 60) may accentuate this reluc-
tance.' 6' That "admired" executives may be faced with criminal prosecution in a culture
154. See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 259.
155. See Labaton, supra note 7.
156. STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 261. See New Curbs on Insider Trading, Market Abuse Agreed to by EU
Parliament, 34 Sec. Reg & L. Rep. (BNA) 432, 433 (2002) (stating that the U.S. SEC's budget is nearly fifty
times larger than Germany's federal regulator).
157. See, e.g., Roman Tomasic, Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia, 9 Comp. & SEC. L.J. 121 (1991).
158. For example, although having a relatively detailed insider trading proscription, South Africa has initi-
ated few, if any, criminal prosecutions. See Zyl, South Aftica Insider Trading Regulation and Enforcement, 15
Comp. LAW. No. 3, at 92 (1994). Although viewed as doing more to combat insider trading than most juris-
dictions, "prosecution of insider trading [in Canada] remains minimal." Ramzi Nasser, The Morality of Insider
Trading in the United States andAbroad, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 377, 385 (1999). With respect tojapan, that country
is perceived as an "'insider's heaven' where people rampantly profit from inside information with little detection
or prosecution." Id. at 382, quoting Tomoko Akashi, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1296, 1302 n.45 (1989).
159. See Andre Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Laws and Securities Regulation, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 757, 762 (1982) (stating that in France tipping of material nonpublic information is perceived as
"a social duty ... expected of relatives and friends"); sources cited supra note 144. But see Wrighton, .rupra
note 6.
160. See, e.g., STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 148 (Japan); Nasser, supra note 158, at 380-84; George F. Parker,
The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan: Introducing a Private Right ofAction, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1399 (1995).
161. See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 264.
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that has declined to embrace the evils of such "gentlemen" offenses frequently is an unlikely
eventuality. 16 Courts also are a key part of this process, often refusing to convict an "insider"
on the basis of circumstantial evidence 163 and levying relatively modest sanctions when guilt
has been proven.-M Although recent developments in certain countries signify that more
vigorous surveillance and enforcement practices are being initiated, 1s a long journey must
be made to approach the effectiveness of U.S. insider trading enforcement.'.
66
Hence, regardless of its "loopholes," the U.S. law of insider trading remains preeminent.
The SEC's key role as regulator, with its capable personnel, resources, and surveillance,
facilitates the active enforcement of the U.S. securities laws. 67 Moreover, criminal prose-
cution for insider trading is now a recognized component of the enforcement landscape. 68
As an additional layer of enforcement, allegedly injured traders may bring civil actions
seeking damages, under certain circumstances, against those who violated the insider trad-
ing prohibitions.1
69
In the United States, the impropriety of insider trading and similar offenses"o is recog-
nized by market participants, the public, and the courts. Hence, unlike several other coun-
tries, the U.S. cultural attitude generally favors relatively vigorous enforcement of these
offenses.' 7' The courts contribute to this process by upholding insider trading convictions
premised on circumstantial evidence 72 and (under the federal sentencing guidelines' 7 1) or-
dering lengthy periods of imprisonment where circumstances warrant.'7 Thus, as com-
162. Id.
163. See Tomasic & Pentony, The Prosecution of Insider Trading: Obstacles to Enforcement, 22 AUST. & N.Z.
CRIMIN. 65, 65-66 (1989); McDonald, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEAlING 439, 442 (Mark Stamp
& Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
164. In Germany, the first conviction for insider trading was not procured until 1995; moreover, no prison
sentence was ordered. See Commerzbank Declines to Comment on Report of Insider-Trading Case, WMAL ST.J., Aug.
22, 1995, at A6. See also Ex-Laoyer Gets Suspended Term for Insider Trading, JAPANs WEEKLY MONITOR, Aug. 4,
1997.
165. See STEINBERG, supra note 88, at 121-40, 214-37; Wrighton, supra note 6.
166. See New Curbs on Insider Trading, Market Abuse Agreed to by EU Parliament, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 432, 433 (2002) (stating that from 1995 through 2000, there were "only 13 successful prosecutions
leading to criminal penalties across the 17 nations of [the] European Union and its neighbors in the European
Economic Area"); Nasser, supra note 158, at 377 (stating that in addition to Canada andJapan, "insider trading
seems to go largely unpunished in Australia, France, Germany, and Mexico").
167. See DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991). But see Labaton, supra note 7.
168. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act § 32(a); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
169. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 20A, Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1980).
170. Such offenses include stock manipulation, parking of securities, and "scalping." See generally NORmAN
S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER: LAW AND REGULATION (3d ed. 2001).
171. See Nasser, supra note 158, at 388-93. Seegenerally WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4.
172. See, e.g., SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Circumstantial evidence, if it meets all the
other criteria of admissibility, is just as appropriate as direct evidence .... quoting United States v. Gamache,
156 F.3d 1, 8 (lst Cir. 1998). Accord, SEC v. Euro Security Fund, 2000 WL 1376246 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Butsee
Katherine Yung, Judge Tosses Insider-Trading Verdict, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 20, 2002, at 1D (federal
district judge overturning jury verdict against insider due to insufficient evidence).
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98. See generally Paul H. Rob-
inson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1231 (1997).
174. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 653-56 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cusimano,
123 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1997).
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pared to other countries, U.S. enforcement in this setting is relatively effective, thereby
promoting law compliance"' and facilitating market integrity.
7 6
IV. Summation
U.S. regulation of insider trading is far from perfect. Without sufficient justification,
ambiguity, complexity, and disparate treatment of similarly situated market participants, at
times, prevail. Perhaps cognizant of these shortcomings, nations with developed securities
markets have declined to follow U.S. standards in the insider trading context. The ap-
proaches endorsed by these other countries seek to set forth clear statutory direction in
regard to the insider trading prohibition. Focusing on the statutes, these nations may have
largely achieved their objectives.'" However, because of insufficient funding, resources,
personnel and surveillance, inadequate enforcement has generally been prevalent in markets
abroad. Laws ordinarily are as potent as their effective implementation. The deterrent effect
of rigorous statutes lessens drastically as the likelihood of successful usage decreases. Hence,
statutes designed to promote market integrity and investor protection have relatively minor
impact if widespread noncompliance persists. The lack of successful enforcement accord-
ingly may induce disobedience by market participants. 78
This scenario helps to explain why the U.S. markets, although generating significant
criticism in light of recent regulatory failures and financial frauds, are viewed as preeminent.
As addressed above, the legal proscriptions concerning insider trading have their shortcom-
ings. Although far from perfect, the standards adopted are viewed as acceptable and are
embedded in the ethos of the U.S. capital markets. Significantly, these standards are ade-
quately enforced by the U.S. SEC, the U.S. Department ofJustice in criminal prosecutions,
and private parties who seek damages from alleged violators. Thus, reasonably effective
enforcement of judicial, statutory, and regulatory pronouncements that define specified
conduct as being illegal promotes compliance with the rule of law and investor confidence
in market integrity.
Several countries, including those that are members of the European Community, are
expending greater resources toward successful implementation of their statutory mandates
proscribing abusive practices such as insider trading. Effective allocation of resources, of
course, entails successfully procuring sufficient personnel, funding, and technological sur-
veillance mechanisms. Agendas also should address educational or "enlightenment" mis-
sions to emphasize the importance of these statutory mandates to affected constituencies,
such as corporate insiders, bankers, brokers, judges, legislators, and the investing public.
175. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 807-909.
176. Id. at 547-672; Nasser, supra note 158, at 388-94; Phelan, Integrity IsA Necessity On Wall Street, N.Y.
LJ., Mar. 16, 1987, at 29. Butsee The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 80-81. Seegenerally
JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADInG: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY (1991); Alan Strudler & Eric W.
Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEx. L. REV. 375 (1999).
177. See supra notes 123-140 and accompanying text.
178. See Bernard Black, The Core Institutions That Support Strong Securities Markets, 55 Bus. LAW. 1565,1576-
78 (2000); Marc I. Steinberg, Emerging Capital Markets: Proposals and Recommendations for Implementation, 30
INT'L LAW. 715, 723-25 (1996).
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